

Variational Inequality technology



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LCP: The approach

	The $K(z,v) = \langle Mz + q, v - z \rangle$ on $\mathbb{R}^n_+ \times \mathbb{R}^n_+$	
- 2, 2	Solves LCF. $z \ge 0$. $(w, z) = 0$ and $0 \le w = Wz + q$	
\mathbf{P}	$\Leftrightarrow \hat{z} \in \arg \max - \inf K \& K(\hat{z}, \bullet) \ge 0$	
\hat{z} s	solves LCP: inf $K(z, \bullet) = -\infty$ unless $Mz + q \ge 0$ (\hat{z} is such a z)	
	with $Mz + q \ge 0, v = 0$ is optimal, and	
Э	$0 = \max_{z \ge 0} - \langle Mz + q, z \rangle \text{ attained by } \hat{z} \text{ with } K(\hat{z}, \bullet) \ge 0$	
\widehat{z}	$\in \arg \max - \inf K \& K(\hat{z}, \bullet) \ge 0$	
	$\Rightarrow \hat{z} \ge 0, M\hat{z} + q \ge 0 \& 0 \text{ potential arg max-inf value}$	
	since $K(\hat{z}, \bullet) \ge 0 \Rightarrow \langle M\hat{z} + q, \hat{z} \rangle \le \langle M\hat{z} + q, 0 \rangle (v = 0)$	
	$\Rightarrow \langle M\hat{z} + q, \hat{z} \rangle = 0, \text{ i.e., } \hat{z} \text{ solves LCP}$	
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LCP: Approximate solutions

$$K^{\nu}(z,\nu) = \left\langle M^{\nu}z + q^{\nu}, \nu - z \right\rangle \text{ on } \mathbb{R}^{n}_{+} \times [0,r^{\nu}]^{n}$$

$$v \in \operatorname{arg\,max-inf} K^{\nu} \text{ with } K^{\nu}(z^{\nu}, \bullet) \ge 0$$

$$\diamondsuit \ \left(M^{\nu} \to M, q^{\nu} \to q, r^{\nu} \nearrow \infty \right) \Rightarrow K^{\nu} \to K^{\nu}_{lop} K^{\nu}_{lop}$$

$$P = \left\{ z \in \mathbb{R}^{n}_{+} | Mz + q \ge 0 \right\}, P^{\nu} = \left\{ z \in [0, r^{\nu}]^{n} | M^{\nu}z + q^{\nu} \ge 0 \right\}$$

When
$$P^{\nu} \to P \Rightarrow K^{\nu} \xrightarrow[lop]{} K$$
 ancillary tight

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Nonlinear Complementarity Problem

 $\hat{z} \ge 0: \langle \hat{w}, \hat{z} \rangle = 0$ and $0 \le \hat{w} = M(\hat{z}) + q$

approximating problem: find

$$z \ge 0 : \langle w, z \rangle = 0$$
 and $0 \le w = M^{\nu}(z) + q^{\nu} \le r^{\nu}$

suppose

find

$$M^{\nu} \to M, q^{\nu} \to q, r^{\nu} \nearrow \infty \text{ and } z^{\nu} \xrightarrow[cluster]{z} \overline{z}$$



define bivariate functions:

$$K(z,v) = \langle M(z) + q, v - z \rangle \text{ on } \mathbb{R}^{n}_{+} \times \mathbb{R}^{n}_{+}$$

$$K^{\nu}(z,\nu) = \left\langle M^{\nu}(z) + q^{\nu}, \nu - z \right\rangle \text{ on } \mathbb{R}^{n}_{+} \times [0,r^{\nu}]^{n}$$

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Arrow-Debreu model



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Market Clearing & Equilibrium

agent's problem: $\overline{x}_i(p) \in \arg \max \left\{ u_i(x_i) | \langle p, x_i - e_i \rangle \le 0 \right\}$ market clearing: $\sum_{i} (e_i - \overline{x}_i(p)) = s(p) \ge 0$ equilibrium price: \overline{p} such that $s(\overline{p}) \ge 0$ Equilibrium with utility scaling: market clearing with $s_i(\overline{p}) = 0$ when $\overline{p}_i > 0$ and $\exists \lambda_i$ (utility scale factor) so that $\overline{x}_i \in \arg\max\left\{u_i(x_i) - \overline{\lambda}_i \left\langle \overline{p}, x_i - e_i \right\rangle\right\}$ $\overline{\lambda}_i \ge 0, \langle \overline{p}, x_i - e_i \rangle \le 0 \text{ if } \overline{\lambda}_i = 0$ $\langle \overline{p}, x_i - e_i \rangle = 0$ if $\overline{\lambda}_i > 0$ May 2007 **Banff Summer School** 9



V.I.:
$$\overline{z} \in C, -G(\overline{z}) \in N_C(\overline{z}) = \left\{ v \left| \left\langle v, z - \overline{z} \right\rangle \le 0, \forall z \in C \right\} \right\}$$

existence of solutions: C convex compact, G continuous

define
$$C = \Delta \times \left[\prod_{i \in I} X_i\right] \times \left[\prod_{i \in I} \mathbb{R}_+\right]$$

 $G: C \to \mathbb{R}^n \times \left[\prod_{i \in I} \mathbb{R}^n\right] \times \left[\prod_{i \in I} \mathbb{R}\right]$
 $G(p; ..., x_i, ...; ..., \lambda_i, ...)$
 $= \left(\sum_i [e_i - x_i]; ..., \lambda_i p - \nabla u_i(x_i), ...; ..., p[e_i - x_i], ...\right)$
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bounding D: "solvable" V.I.

from *C* to \hat{C} bounded with explicit bounds derived via duality (global bound for X_i : κ_i depends on 'var'(u_a))

$$-G(\overline{p},(\overline{x}_i),(\overline{\lambda}_i)) \in N_{\hat{C}}(\overline{p},(\widetilde{x}_i),(\overline{\lambda}_i))$$

$$\hat{C} = \Delta \times \left(\prod_{i} \hat{X}_{i}\right) \times \left(\prod_{i} [0, \kappa_{i}]\right)$$

Polyhedral case: efficient algorithmic procedures

Limiting iterative scheme

Theorem. When $\kappa^{\nu} \ge$ threshold, $(p^{\nu}, (x_i^{\nu}))$ furnish a classical equilibrium w.r.t. X_i and u_i but possibly with different endowments $e_i^{\nu} \ge e_i, e_i^{\nu} \rightarrow e_i$. The sequence of nearby classical equilibria $(p^{\nu}, (x_i^{\nu}))$ is bounded and every cluster point $(\overline{p}, (\overline{x_i}))$ furnishes a virtual equilibirum. When only one virtual equilibrium exists, it's the limit of the sequence.



Consumption & Production

Consumers: choose $x_i \in X_i$ Producers: choose $y_i \in Y_i$ Endowment and shares: $e_i + \sum_{j} \theta_{ij} y_j, \theta_{ij} \ge 0, \sum_{i} \theta_{ij} = 1$ Walrasian Equilibrium: as earlier (adjusted endowments) and $\overline{y}_j \in \arg \max \left[\left\langle \overline{p}, y_j \right\rangle \middle| y_j \in Y_j \right]$ \Rightarrow V.I. functional type: $-G(\overline{z}) \in \partial f(\overline{z}) \Leftrightarrow \overline{z} \in M(\overline{z})$ $M = (I + \alpha \partial f)^{-1} \circ (I - \alpha G)$, for any $\alpha > 0$

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Equivalent nonsmooth mapping





The "Newton" step



A dynamic problem

Agent's problems: max $u_i^0(x^0) + u_i^1(x^1)$ so that $\langle p^0, x^0 + T_i^0 y \rangle \leq \langle p^0, e^0 \rangle$ $\langle p^1, x^1 \rangle \leq \langle p^1, e^1 + T_i^1 y \rangle$ $x^0 \in X^0, x^1 \in X^1, y \ge 0$ y_i activity levels (savings, production technology, ...) $T_i^0 y_i$ input goods, $T_i^1 y_i$ output goods May 2007 **Banff Summer School** 19

using PATH Solver



