

Multi-Agent Optimization (6)

III. Stochastic Models

Stochastic: Numerical procedure(s)

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Pure Exchange: Walras

agent's problem: Agents: $i \in \mathcal{I}$ | \mathcal{I} | *finite* "large"

$\bar{x}_i \in \arg \max u_i(x_i)$ so that $\langle p, x_i \rangle \leq \langle p, e_i \rangle$, $x_i \in X_i$

e_i : endowment of agent i , $e_i \in \text{int } X_i$

u_i : utility of agent i , concave, usc

$u_i : X_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $X_i \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ (survival set) convex

market clearing: $s(p) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} (e_i - \bar{x}_i)$ excess supply

equilibrium price: $\bar{p} \in \Delta$ such that $s(\bar{p}) \geq 0$

Δ unit simplex

The Walrasian

$$W(p, q) = \langle q, s(p) \rangle, \quad W : \Delta \times \Delta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

\bar{p} equilibrium price (Ky Fan Inequality)

$$\Leftrightarrow \bar{p} \in \arg \max_p (\inf_q W(p, q)) \& s(\bar{p}) \geq 0$$

Properties of W :

continuous in p ($e_i \in \text{int } C_i$, ' i -inf-compact') usc

linear in q , Δ compact, convex

$$W(p, p) \geq 0, \quad \forall p \in \Delta$$

i.e., W is a Ky Fan function

Numerical Approaches

◆ Augmented Walrasian:

$$\bar{p} \in \operatorname{argmax}\text{-inf } W$$

$$\cong \text{ saddle point } (\bar{p}, \bar{q}) \text{ of } \tilde{W}_r$$

$$\tilde{W}_r(p, q) = \inf_z \{ W(p, z) \mid \|z - q\| \leq r \},$$

$\|\cdot\|$ an appropriate norm ($\|\cdot\|_\infty$ e.g.)


Variational Inequality

$$\max_x u_i(x_i) \text{ so that } \langle p, x_i \rangle \leq \langle p, e_i \rangle, x_i \in C_i$$

$$\sum_i (e_i - c_i) = s(p) \geq 0.$$



$$N_D(\bar{z}) = \{v \mid \langle v, z - \bar{z} \rangle \leq 0, \forall z \in D\}$$



$$G(p, (x_i), (\lambda_i)) = \left[\sum_i (e_i - x_i); (\lambda_i p - \nabla u_i(x_i)); \langle p, e_i - x_i \rangle \right]$$

$$D = \Delta \times \left(\prod_i C_i \right) \times \left(\prod_i \mathbb{R}_+ \right)$$

$$-G(\bar{p}, (\bar{x}_i), (\bar{\lambda}_i)) \in N_D(\bar{p}, (\bar{x}_i), (\bar{\lambda}_i))$$

D unbounded $\rightarrow \hat{D}$ bounded

Stochastic Equilibrium Model

Pure Exchange model
with Input/Output activities

Agent- i problem-stochastic

$$\max_{x_i^0, y_i \in \mathbb{R}^n, x_{i,\cdot}^1 \in \mathcal{M}} u_i^0(x_i^0) + E_i \left\{ u_i^1(\xi, x_{i,\xi}^1) \right\}$$

$$\text{so that } \left\langle p^0, x_i^0 + T_i^0 y_i \right\rangle \leq \left\langle p^0, e_i^0 \right\rangle$$

$$\left\langle p_\xi^1, x_{i,\xi}^1 \right\rangle \leq \left\langle p_\xi^1, e_{i,\xi}^1 + T_{i,\xi}^1 y_i \right\rangle, \forall \xi \in \Xi$$

$$x_i^0 \in X_i^0, \quad x_{i,\xi}^1 \in X_{i,\xi}^1, \quad \forall \xi \in \Xi$$

☀ $E_i \{ \cdot \}$ rational expectation w.r.t. i -beliefs

Stochastic program with recourse: 2-stage

Well-developed solution procedures

Well-developed “approximation theory”

Simplest-classical assumptions

Ξ finite (support)

$u_i^0 : X_i^0 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $\forall \xi \in \Xi$, $u_i^1(\xi, \bullet) : X_{i,\xi}^1 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ concave
continuous. (numerics: differentiable)

$T_i^0, T_{i,\xi}^1$: input-output matrices

(production, investment, etc.)

$X_i^0, X_{i,\xi}^1$: closed, convex, non-empty interior

$e_i^0 \in \text{int } X_i^0$, $e_{i,\xi}^1 \in \text{int } X_{i,\xi}^1$ for all ξ

Market Clearing

Agents: $i \in \mathcal{I}$, $|\mathcal{I}|$ finite "large"

$$\left(\bar{x}_i^0, \bar{y}_i, \left\{ \bar{x}_{i,\xi}^1 \right\}_{\xi \in \Xi} \right) \in \arg \max \{ \text{agent-}i \text{ problem} \}$$

excess supply:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \left(e_i^0 - (\bar{x}_i^0 + T_i^0 \bar{y}_i) \right) = s^0(p^0, \{p_\xi^1\}_{\xi \in \Xi}) \geq 0$$

$\forall \xi \in \Xi$:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \left(e_{i,\xi}^1 + T_{i,\xi}^1 \bar{y}_i - \bar{x}_{i,\xi}^1 \right) = s_\xi^1(p^0, \{p_\xi^1\}_{\xi \in \Xi}) \geq 0$$

Here-&-Now vs. Wait-&-See

- ◆ Basic Process: decision --> observation --> decision

$$(x_i^0, y_i) \rightarrow \xi \rightarrow x_{i,\xi}^1$$

- ◆ Here-&-now problem!

not all contingencies available at time 0

(x_i^0, y_i) can't depend on ξ !

- ◆ Wait-&-see problem

implicitly all contingencies available at time 0

choose $(x_{i,\xi}^0, y_{i,\xi}^0, x_{i,\xi}^1)$ after observing x

- ◆ incomplete  complete market ?

Fundamental Theorem of Stochastic Optimization

A here-and-now problem can be “reduced” to a wait-and-see problem by introducing the

appropriate ‘contingency’ costs
(price of nonanticipativity)

Contingencies prices (nonanticipativity)

Here-&-now

$$\max E \{ f(\xi, z^0, z_\xi^1) \}$$

$$z^0 \in C^0 \subset \mathbb{R}^{n_1},$$

$$z_\xi^1 \in C_\xi^1(z^0), \forall \xi.$$

Explicit nonanti. constraints

$$\max E \{ f(\xi, z_\xi^0, z_\xi^1) \}$$

$$z_\xi^0 \in C^0 \subset \mathbb{R}^{n_1},$$

$$z_\xi^1 \in C_\xi^1(z^0), \forall \xi.$$


$$z_\xi^0 = E \{ z_\xi^0 \} \forall \xi$$

$$w_\xi \perp c^{\text{ste}} \text{ fcns}$$

$$\Rightarrow E \{ w_\xi \} = 0$$

Progressive Hedging

◆ Step 0. $w^0(\cdot)$ so that $E\{w^0(\xi)\} = 0$, $v = 0$

◆ Step 1. for all ξ :

$$\left(z_\xi^{0,v}, z_\xi^{1,v}\right) \in \arg \max f(\xi; z^0, z^1) - \langle w_\xi^v, z^0 \rangle$$

$$z^0 \in C^0 \subset \mathbb{R}^{n_0}, z^1 \in C^1(\xi, x^0) \subset \mathbb{R}^{n_1}$$

◆ Step 2. $w_\xi^{v+1} = w_\xi^v + \rho \left[z_\xi^{0,v} - E\{z_\xi^{0,v}\} \right]$, $\rho > 0$

■ and return to Step 1, $v = v + 1$

◆ Convergence: add proximal term

$$-\frac{\rho}{2} \left\| z_\xi^{0,v} - E\{z_\xi^{0,v}\} \right\|^2, \text{ linear rate in } (z^v, w^v)$$

Disintegration: agent's problem

with $p_{\diamond} = \left(p^0, \{p_{\xi}^1\}_{\xi \in \Xi} \right)$

$$\left(\bar{x}_{i,\xi}^0, \bar{y}_{i,\xi}^0, \bar{x}_{i,\xi}^1 \right) \in$$

'i-contingency' costs

$$\arg \max_{x_i^0, y_i, x_i^1} \left\{ u_i^0(x_i^0) - \langle \bar{w}_{i,\xi}, (x_i^0, y_i) \rangle + u_i^1(\xi, x_i^1) \right\}$$

$$\langle p^0, x_i^0 \rangle \leq \langle p^0, e_i^0 - T_i^0 y_i \rangle$$

$$\langle p_{\xi}^1, x_i^1 \rangle \leq \langle p_{\xi}^1, e_{i,\xi}^1 + T_{i,\xi}^1 y_i \rangle,$$

$$x_i^0 \in X_i^0, \quad x_i^1 \in X_{i,\xi}^1.$$

solved for each ξ separately

Incomplete to ‘Complete’ Market

$\forall \xi \in \Xi$ (separately),

agent's problem:

$$\left(\bar{x}_i^0, \bar{y}_i^0, \bar{x}_{i,\xi}^1\right) \in \arg \max \left\{ u_i^{w_{i,\xi}} \left(x_i^0, y_i^0, x_i^1 \right) \text{ on } \widehat{C}_{i,\xi} \left(p^0, p_\xi^1 \right) \right\}$$

for $\{w_{i,\xi}\}_{\xi \in \Xi}$ associated with (p^0, p_ξ^1)

clear market:

$$s^0(p^0, p_\xi^1) \geq 0, \quad s_\xi^1(p^0, p_\xi^1) \geq 0$$

Arrow-Debreu ‘stochastic’ equilibrium problem

THE WALRASIAN

$$W(p_{\diamond}, q_{\diamond}) = \langle q_{\diamond}, s(p_{\diamond}) \rangle$$

$$= \left\langle (q^0, \{q_{\xi}^1\}_{\xi \in \Xi}), \left(s^0(p^0, \{p_{\xi}^1\}_{\xi \in \Xi}), \left\{ s_{\xi}^1(p^0, \{p_{\xi}^1\}_{\xi \in \Xi}) \right\}_{\xi \in \Xi} \right) \right\rangle$$

$$W : \prod_{1+|\Xi|} \Delta \times \prod_{1+|\Xi|} \Delta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

linear w.r.t. q_{\diamond} , continuous w.r.t. p_{\diamond}

$$W(p_{\diamond}, p_{\diamond}) \geq 0.$$

provided $s(\cdot)$ continuous w.r.t. p_{\diamond}

↑ like in lecture no.3



IV. Experimentation

with PATH Solver (experimental)

- ◆ Economy: (5 goods)
 - Skilled & unskilled workers
 - Businesses: Basic goods & leisure
 - Banker: bonds (riskless), 2 stocks
- ◆ 2-stages, 280 scenarios, 2776 scenarios
- ◆ utilities: CES-functions (gen. Cobb-Douglas)
 - Utility in stage 2 assigned to financial instruments
 - only used for transfer in stage 1
- ◆ on laptop: ~4 min, ~14 min, but
extremely parallelizable algorithm

with PATH Solver (stochastic)

◆ objectives: $u_i^0(x_i^0) + u_i^1(x_i^1) \Rightarrow$

$$u_i^0(x_i^0) - \langle w_{i,\xi}^v, (x_i^0, y_i) \rangle - \frac{\rho_i}{2} |(x_i^0, y_i) - (\hat{x}_i^{0,v}, \hat{y}_i^v)|^2 + u_i^1(x_i^1)$$

◆ updating: $(\hat{x}_i^{0,v}, \hat{y}_i^v) = E_i \{ (x_{i,\xi}^{0,v}, y_{i,\xi}^v) \}$

$$w_{i,\xi}^{v+1} = w_{i,\xi}^v + \rho_i ((x_{i,\xi}^{0,v}, y_{i,\xi}^v) - (\hat{x}_i^{0,v}, \hat{y}_i^v))$$

$\rho_i > 0$ yields convergence

◆ also requires a proximal term to `support' convergence of equilibrium prices

